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The NCAA on Notice: How Utilizing
Principles of Federalism Could
Relieve Antitrust Pressure
ABSTRACT

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) was
founded to protect athletes from injury and to provide an avenue for the
pursuit of sport alongside the pursuit of education. The NCAA
maintains that accomplishing each of those goals requires the
preservation of amateurism through a cap on the amount of funds
universities may disburse to athletes. Historically, value judgments
saved the NCAA from antitrust challenges because courts found that the
NCAA's rules furthered the organization'spurpose. As antitrustlaw has
developed over the past fifty years, however, courts have become
increasingly determined to avoid value judgments in antitrust
challenges. Thus, it is simply a matter of time before courts' value
judgments on amateurism will be unable to save the NCAA in antitrust
challenges. The NCAA should respond by looking to principles of
federalism in American governance. This Note explains how the NCAA
could learn from federalism principles and delegate scholarship
rulemaking authority to the individual conferences to relieve antitrust
pressure.
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Organizations often face a point in time where one looming
decision proves pivotal to the future direction of the organization,
sometimes even detaching the organization from its original purpose.
For example, the National Rifle Association (NRA) was originally
founded to improve youths' ability to accurately shoot a rifle.' Over the
last fifty years, however, that vision has changed. 2 In 1966, the Black
Panthers of California protested police brutality against black people
who carried firearms in public, 3 creating a large amount of Second
Amendment publicity. 4 This publicity arguably compelled the NRA to
take a stand.5 The organization overhauled its direction to begin
defending individuals' rights under the Second Amendment.6
The commercialization of college sports, combined with
developments in antitrust law since the NCAA's inception in 1905, has
brought the NCAA to a similar crossroads. Recently, the NCAA has
received heightened criticism from scholars and journalists.' Countless

See, e.g., A Brief History of the NRA, NAT'L RIFLE ASS'N, https://home.nra.org/about1.
the-nral [https://perma.ccF3F6-7AEH] (last visited Jan. 8, 2019); RadiolabPresents:More Perfect-

The Gun Show, WNYC STUDIOS (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/radiolabpresents-more-perfect-gun-show [https://perma.cc/C2SH-XG8F] [hereinafter The Gun Show].
See Ron Elving, The NRA Wasn't Always Against Gun Restrictions, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
2.
(Oct. 10, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/10/556578593/the-nra-wasnt-alwaysagainst-gun-restrictions [https://perma.cc/7XL3-T8B7].

Black Panthers, HISTORY (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/civil-rights3.
movement/black-panthers [https://perma.cc/A795-Z5PD].
4.
5.
6.

See The Gun Show, supra note 1.
See id; Elving, supra note 2.
See The Gun Show, supra note 1.

See, e.g., Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender ofAmateurism
7.
or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (2007); see also GABE FELDMAN, THE NCAA
AND "NON-GAME RELATED" STUDENT-ATHLETE NAME, IMAGE AND LIKENESS RESTRICTIONS (2016),
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scholars have argued for change in the NCAA's most revered tradition:
amateurism. 8 The criticism stems from the NCAA's rules preventing
athletes from receiving compensation for their performance or for their
name, image, or likeness while pursuing a college education. 9 The
amateurism rules have been labeled as "oppressing" and "exploiting"
student-athletes.1 0 While societal pressures might not force the NCAA
to change its rules or governance structure, the rise of antitrust actions
against it could.
This Note argues that restricting the amount of scholarship
money distributed to student-athletes through the amateurism regime
allows the NCAA to pursue an admirable goal: providing the largest
number of opportunities for students to pursue education through
athletic scholarships." The problem is that even in the pursuit of this
respectable goal, the confines of amateurism are in constant tension
with section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 12 Antitrust law limits the
preservation of amateurism by shifting the burden to the NCAA to
justify its caps on the market for college athletics.1 3 To relieve the
pressure of antitrust litigation the NCAA faces, this Note recommends
that the NCAA utilize principles of federalism to avoid running afoul of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. By doing so, the NCAA could delegate
scholarship compensation rules to each individual "Power Five"
Conference, the five largest in the NCAA, 14 while retaining authority

https://www.knightcommission.org/wp-

content/uploads/2008/10/feldmannil_white-paper may_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/69N8-GQNR].
8.
Lazaroff, supranote 7, at 361; see also FELDMAN, supra note 7.
9.

NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, DIVISION I MANUAL: 2018-19 NCAA

§

12.1.2.1

(2018),
https://web3.ncaa.org/1sdbilreports/getReport/90008
[https://perma.cc/WPB9-QCAY]
[hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
10.
See, e.g., Jemele Hill, A Call to Action for College Athletes, ESPN (Apr. 6, 2011),
http://www.espn.com/espn/commentary/news/story?page=hill/110405

[https://perma.cclFFR5-

2FWQ] ("Instead of allowing coaches and middlemen to use them for short-term gains, college
athletes should unite to break the system that is oppressing them."); Victoria L. Jackson, A Jim
Crow
Divide
in
College
Sports,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Jan.
16,
2018,
3:05
PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-college-sports-ncaa-black-

athletes-exploited-01 17-20180116-story.html [https://perma.cc/N6N9-UJLQ] ("Rather, I can't
endorse a system that exploits football and basketball players so that 'nonrevenue' athletes like
me-runners, tennis players, golfers, gymnasts, swimmers-can both play and study."). For the

purposes of this Note, "amateurism" is defined as the NCAA's regime of capping players'
scholarship amounts at a certain level. See NCAA MANUAL §§ 2.9, 3.1.2.5.
11.
See O'Bannon v. Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2015).
12.
See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §1 (2018)).
13.
See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98,
113 (1984).
14.
The Power Five Conferences consist of the Big 12 Conference, Southeastern
Conference, Atlantic Coastal Conference, Pac-12 Conference, and the Big Ten Conference. See
Paula Lavigne, Rich Get Richer in College Sports as Poorer Schools Struggle to Keep Up, ESPN
(Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.espn.comlespnlotl/story//id/17447429/power-5-conference-schools-
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over academic requirements and infractions investigations. Doing so
relieves antitrust pressure from the NCAA without jeopardizing the
NCAA's ability to pursue its founding purpose.
Part I of this Note explains the history of the NCAA amateurism
rules and governance structure. Part II discusses how the Chicago
School of Thought persuaded courts to abandon making value
judgments in antitrust actions. It then explains how the abandonment
of value judgments positively correlates with the validity of antitrust
suits against the NCAA. Part III proposes that the NCAA adopt
principles of federalism to resolve the tension facing the NCAA in
antitrust actions. It further explains how those principles could be
adopted on a practical level through the expansion of the areas of
autonomy in the NCAA Manual.
I. KEEPING WITH THE DIGNITY AND HIGH PURPOSE OF EDUCATION

In 1905, eighteen different college and amateur football players
were killed while playing football.15 President Theodore Roosevelt
responded to the news of these fatalities by hosting a meeting at the
White House to investigate the dangers of the sport and to propose a
solution. 16 On March 31, 1906, executives of this newly formed
committee presented a constitution to universities around the country
for ratification.1 7 Just a few years later, in 1909, the New York Times
published a story reporting the founding of an organization charged
with overseeing what would eventually become the modern National
Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA). 18 The founding included a
statement of purpose for the organization:
[The object of the NCAA] shall be the regulation and supervision of college athletics
throughout the United States, in order that the athletic activities in the colleges and
universities of the United States may be maintained on an ethical plane in keeping
19
with the dignity and high purpose of education.

made-6-billion-last-year-gap-haves-nots-grows [https://perma.cc/3S64-FQ7S]. The resources to
offer scholarships above cost of attendance are much higher in the Power Five than in the other
conferences making up the NCAA, thus this Note is limited in scope to adjustments in the
legislation of the Power Five Conferences, not every conference in the NCAA. See id.
Dan Treadway, Why Does the NCAA Exist?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017, 1:39PM),
15.
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-treadway/johnny-manziel-ncaa-eligibility-.b
3020985.html [https://perma.cc/VAY7-BN3Q].
Id.
16.
W. Burlette Carter, The Age of Innocence: The First 25 Years of the National Collegiate
17.
Athletics Association, 1906 to 1931, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 211, 220, 235 (2006).
Notable Educators Meet to Discuss the Uplifting of College Athletics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
18.
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1909/01/03/101032578.pdf
1909),
3,
[https://perma.cclN7JP-NFW8] [hereinafter Notable Educators].
Id.
19.
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In its historical context, the organization's purpose seemed
evident: protect collegiate athletes' safety and integrity while ensuring
that their educational experience is not diminished in pursuit of sport.
The NCAA rules ensured that the educational experience remained
intact by declaring any students who accepted financial resources as
consideration to enter any athletic contest or organization ineligible to
compete in the NCAA. 20 In fact, those dedicated to the concept of
amateurism believed that athletic ability should have no relation to
financial aid packages awarded to athletes; only academic performance
should warrant aid towards tuition to academic institutions. 21
This Note is limited in its discussion to the two most dominant
collegiate sports, men's basketball and football, even though the NCAA
is a much larger entity comprised of countless committees, boards,
councils, and cabinets governing multiple sports. 22 This Part lays the
historical foundation for the NCAA and explains the history of both
student-athlete
scholarship disbursements
and organizational
governance since its inception. It concludes with a summary of how
those policies led to the two most important antitrust cases in the
NCAA's history.
A. History of NCAA Scholarship Rules
While the early years of the NCAA may seem uneventful in
comparison to the prevalent legal challenges over the last few decades,
even early expansion within the NCAA resulted in tension with its
founding principles. 23 Lofty educational requirements kept many highperforming athletes off of the field, and unsuccessful teams found
themselves with empty pocketbooks. 24 Successful programs, such as
the Ohio State University, built stadiums seating thousands of fans as
early as 1921.25 The pressure to succeed and expand contradicted the
NCAA Constitution's stated objective: keeping with the dignity and
high purpose of education. 26

&

20.
Carter, supra note 17, at 223.
21.
Id. at 232.
22.
While this Note directly addresses football and men's basketball, its solution could,
and should, be implemented across all NCAA sports.
23.
Notable Educators, supra note 18.
24.
Carter, supra note 17, at 235. For a discussion on the public importance and value of
football on high-performing athletes, see Ramsey W. Fisher, Evaluating a "Concussion Clause":
Why the NFL's Assumption of Risk Defense Fares No Better As Time Goes On, 21 VAND. J. ENT.
TECH. L. 651, 668-69 (2019).
25.
Id. at 236. Ohio State's stadium would seat 64,000, Illinois planned a 75,000-seat
stadium, and Nebraska broke ground on a 30,000-seat stadium in 1923. Id.
26.
Notable Educators, supra note 18.
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As a result, schools had a choice-prioritize academics or
prioritize athletics. The University of Chicago, for example, chose
academics by leaving the Big Ten Conference and scrapping its football
team in 1939.27 In response, the Big Ten Conference turned its sights
not to another academic powerhouse, but to Michigan State-a public
institution known for its athletic prowess. 28 Thus, as conferences
pursued athletic expansion, the NCAA lost programs that aligned with
its stated purpose of amateurism, and the movement of collegiate sports
as a successful business model was well underway.
1. The 1948 Sanity Code
Pinning down the exact point in time that the NCAA
transformed from a moderately sized association into a billion-dollar
one is impossible. Daniel Lazaroff, in his 2007 historical analysis of the
NCAA, 29 defined the "Modern Era" as beginning in 1948 with the
NCAA's adoption of the Sanity Code. The Sanity Code prohibited
institutions from distributing scholarships or other forms of payment to
players based on their athletic ability-effectively codifying the
amateurist view of collegiate sports from the founding era mentioned
above. 30 Thus, a player's financial need and academic accomplishments
determined his financial aid package-not his athletic ability.3 1
Lazaroff contends that the passage of this code marked a
historical turning point in NCAA rules and regulations and provided
the impetus for many of the regulations currently in force today.32 The
Sanity Code was met with intense opposition and proved difficult to
enforce. 33 For that reason, the NCAA abandoned the Sanity Code in
1951 and replaced it with the grant-in-aid system-allowing athletes to
receive aid regardless of their academic accomplishments. 3 4
Eventually, at the NCAA Convention in 1956, the organization adjusted

27.
Joshua Williams, Big Ten Football: The Forgotten Big Ten Member, the Chicago
Maroons, BLEACHER REP. (June 18, 2011), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/663252-big-tenfootball-the-forgotten-big- 10- member-the-chicago-marroons [https://perma.cc/X2XG-G568].
28.

WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 41-

42, 45 (1995).
Lazaroff, supranote 7, at 332-33 ("Consequently, in 1948, the NCAA took a significant
29.
step by adopting the so-called Sanity Code in an effort to develop a meaningful enforcement
mechanism to assure compliance with its rules and regulations. The Sanity Code restricted
financial aid to student-athletes by requiring that recipients utilize the 'normal channels' that
other students were compelled to follow.").
Id.
30.
BYERS, supra note 28, at 67.
31.
Lazaroff, supra note 7, at 334.
32.
BYERS, supra note 28, at 68.
33.
Id.
34.
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its constitution to allow colleges to pay student-athletes all "commonly
accepted educational expenses"-essentially allowing for universities
to provide scholarships for tuition and fees associated with the
institution. 35
In 1973, the NCAA was split into three divisions-I, II, and 111.36
The NCAA rules enabled Division I and Division II to utilize athletic
scholarships, but prohibited Division III programs from offering such
scholarships. 37 The rules surrounding these scholarships remained
roughly intact until the 2014 seminal case, O'Bannon v. NCAA, which
is discussed below. With the help of the findings in O'Bannon, the
NCAA allowed an increase in scholarship funds up to the value of cost
of attendance. 38 Before 2014, scholarship funds could not exceed the
cost of tuition at each athlete's respective university. Allowing funds
up to cost of attendance to be distributed allowed universities to include
costs of room, board, and other necessities into the total scholarship
disbursements given to athletes. 39
B. NCAA Governance Structure
In 2014, the NCAA implemented a new concept, the "areas of
autonomy," which gave the Power Five Conferences a voice in
legislation directly affecting them. 40 Only sixty-five institutions-out
of the 1,200 members who make up the NCAA-comprise the Power
Five Conferences. 4 1 Despite these sixty-five members creating a
majority of the revenue in college sports, they were previously unable
to pass legislation in each of their best interests because they were a
numerical minority. Some have argued these five conferences could
split off from the NCAA and govern themselves if they so desired. 4 2
Respecting this threat and aiming to please the Power Five
Conferences, the NCAA created the areas of autonomy 43 in 2014,
relinquishing legislative authority to the members of these Power Five

35.
Id. at 72.
36.
History of Division II, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/history-division-ii
[https://perma.cc/V6YW-JPG4] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
Id.
37.
38.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 15.01.6.
39.
Id. § 5.3.2.1.2.
40.
Id. § 5.3.2.1.
41.
Connor J. Bush, Comment, The Legal Shift of the NCAA's Big 5 Member Conferences
to Independent Athletic Associations: Combining NFL and Conference Governance Principles to
Maintain the Unique Productof College Athletics, 16 U. DENv. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 5 (2014). The
Power Five Conferences create a majority of the revenue in all of college sports, solely through
football television deals. Id. at 41-42.
42.
Id. at 9-10.
43.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 5.3.2.1.2.
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Conferences on eleven enumerated issues.44 One portion of legislation
absent from that list, however, is the ability to legislate the amount of
funds distributable to student-athletes in excess of the cost of
attendance. 45 The areas of autonomy only offer discretion to the Power
Five Conferences to legislate financial aid up to the cost of attendance.4 6
Further, the rules that the Power Five Conferences adopt currently
bind the group collectively. 47 This Note argues that the NCAA should
reconsider the areas of autonomy. Rather than forcing the Power Five
Conferences to regulate one another as one unit, the NCAA should
utilize principles of federalism in which the conferences are permitted
to govern themselves in areas of compensation individually, while the
NCAA should retain authority over minimum academic and conduct
requirements and enforcement of such requirements.
C. The Seminal Antitrust Challenges
Arguably the greatest basketball coach of all time, 48 John
49
Wooden, earned $32,500 in 1975-his final year as a coach at UCLA.
Just one decade later, Jim Valvano of North Carolina State reportedly
grossed $850,000 per year from his combined business opportunities. 5 0
Adjusting Wooden's salary for inflation over one decade would have
increased his salary to $65,137 in 1985.51 Therefore, Valvano's salary
in 1985 was approximately sixteen times higher than Wooden's would
have been in the same year. One explanation for this astounding jump
may be the most important antitrust case in the history of the NCAA,
Board of Regents of Oklahoma v. NCAA.
"It is virtually impossible to overstate the degree of our
resentment of the controls of the NCAA," stated Bill Banowsky,
President of the University of Oklahoma, during a federal district court
44.

The "areas of autonomy" are enumerated as: athletics personnel; insurance and career

transition; promotional activities unrelated to athletics participation; recruiting restrictions; preenrollment expenses and support; financial aid; awards, benefits, and expenses; academic support;
health and wellness; meals and nutrition; and time demands. Id.
Id. § 2.13 ("A student-athlete may receive athletically related financial aid
45.
administered by the institution without violating the principle of amateurism, provided the
amount does not exceed the cost of education authorized by the Association."); Id. § 5.3.2.1.2.
Id. § 5.3.2.1.2.
46.
Id.
47.
Sporting News donned Wooden as the greatest coach of all time in 2009. See
48.
29,
2009),
ESPN
(July
Honors
Wooden,
Sporting
News
Associated
Press,
[https://perma.cc/C7ANhttp://www.espn.com/mens-college basketball/news/story?id=4365068
6JEA].
BYERS, supra note 28, at 9.
49.
Id.
50.
51.

INFLATION

CALCULATOR,

XELQ] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).

https://westegg.comlinflation/

[https://perma.cc/Z4PV-

2019]1

NCAA ON NOTICE

1099

hearing in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 5 2
Banowsky's comment
eminently clarified the frustration many major programs felt in the
early litigation stages of the most infamous case levied against the
NCAA. 53 After appeals from the district court and the US Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide the dispute between the NCAA and its member institutions. 54
The Court held that "by curtailing output and blunting the ability of
member institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA
ha[d] restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate
athletics in the Nation's life."5 5

Boardof Regents blazed a trail for universities to take advantage
of television rights, just as the NCAA had been doing for many years.
This opened the door for universities to earn a more significant profit
from college sports. Unfortunately, the old adage rings true: more
money, more problems. 56
Three decades later, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit decided the second major antitrust challenge facing the NCAA.
While cultural sports fans will largely remember former UCLA
basketball player Ed O'Bannon's case against the NCAA as ruining
collegiate video games, much more was actually determined in the
Ninth Circuit's 2014 decision. While watching a friend play a college
basketball video game in his living room, Ed O'Bannon had a funny
feeling.5 7 He realized that his name, his face, and his stature combined
to assist game developers and sponsors in earning a profit-of which
O'Bannon would never receive a royalty.5 8 On behalf of a class of
student-athletes, O'Bannon sued the NCAA and EA Sports under an
antitrust theory, alleging that forbidding college athletes from
capitalizing in the intellectual property market violated the Sherman
Antitrust Act.59 The allegations advanced two theories: (1) The NCAA
could not prevent athletes from capitalizing on their name, image, and
likeness through a restrictive rule forbidding athletes from receiving

52.
BYERS, supra note 28, at 8.
53.
See id.
54.
Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88
(1984).
55.
Id. at 120.
56.
See THE NOTORIOUS B.I.G., Mo'Money, Mo'Problems,on LIFE AFTER DEATH (Bad Boy
Record Label 1997). The FBI investigations illustrate the "problems" that faced many universities
after the significant rises in profits in college sports. See infra Part II.B.3.
57.

ED O'BANNON & MICHAEL MCCANN, COURT JUSTICE: THE INSIDE STORY OF MY BATTLE

AGAINST THE NCAA 6 (2018).
58.
Id.
59.
O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
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compensation untethered to education6 0 and (2) the NCAA violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act by capping the amount of compensation athletes
could receive at just tuition and fees. 6 1 The district court agreed with
both of the plaintiffs' arguments, holding that prohibiting compensation
for players' likenesses restrains trade among the NCAA's member
schools. 62
On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's holding concerning name, image, and likeness compensation,
explaining that "in finding that paying students cash compensation
would promote amateurism as effectively as not paying them, the
district court ignored that not paying student-athletes is precisely what
The court, however, upheld the
makes them amateurs." 63
determination that capping the amount of compensation at tuition and
fees violated the Sherman Antitrust Act because allowing athletes to
receive the full cost of attendance as a scholarship was a less restrictive
alternative that continued to tether scholarship awards to educational
expenses. 64
A few years later, the US District Court for the Northern District
of California issued an opinion in a related case, In re NCAA Grant-inAid Cap Antitrust Litigation.65 In that case, Judge Claudia Wilken
determined that the newly enacted cost of attendance cap also
significantly restrained trade in the market for college athletes. 6 6
However, the court did recognize a line of demarcation between college
athletics and professional athletics, and it explained that prohibiting
unlimited cash payments was a reasonable restraint to preserve
consumer demand of college sports.67 Regardless, the evolution of
antitrust cases against the NCAA reveals that pressure continues to
mount, as the NCAA is unable to rest its defense on a societal judgment
on the value of amateurism.

Id. at 971.
60.
Id. at 1008.
61.
Id. at 1007.
62.
Id. at 1076.
63.
Id. at 1074.
64.
In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, Findings of Fact and Conclusions
65.
of Law, No. 14-md-02541, 1 (N.D. Cal. 2019) [hereinafter In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Litigation],
available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/lOuzba24_iynEFMCXz4zXOXk-FOXcY2Xn/view.
Id. at 2.
66.
Id. at 44.
67.
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II. THE RISE OF COMMENSURABILITY CREATES ANTITRUST PRESSURE
ON THE NCAA

This Part discusses how the Chicago School of Thought-an
economic theory promoting the free allocation of resources-ncouraged
courts to abandon making value judgments in antitrust actions. It then
explains how the abandonment of value judgments directly correlates
with the validity of antitrust suits against the NCAA.
A. Antitrust Framework and Commensurability'sRise
The amateurism regime-capping the price at which college
athletes receive athletic scholarship-places the burden on the NCAA
to justify its restraint of trade. 68 However, this Note argues that the
NCAA can continue to pursue its founding purpose without conflicting
with antitrust laws by delegating rules that regulate amateurism to the
Power Five Conferences. The initial purpose of the NCAA was to
protect the integrity and safety of students participating in sport while
pursuing an education. 69 The NCAA contends that preserving such
character requires prohibiting payments to student-athletes, 70 but the
Sherman Antitrust Act disregards the purpose a monopoly is pursuing
when it restrains trade.7 1 Thus, even if pursuing amateurism is an
admirable goal, it does not insulate the NCAA from antitrust scrutiny,
especially with the rise of commensurability. Commensurability in
antitrust consists of comparing economic actors to a common standard
without relying on moral, or value, judgments. 72 Thus, as far as this
Note is concerned, commensurability is the outgrowth of the Chicago
School of Thought's insistence that the judiciary should attempt to
reduce antitrust decisions strictly to the economic ramifications of the
agreement. 73
Before O'Bannon, the judiciary often determined that the
amateurism rules should not even be subject to antitrust review. 74 For
example, in a 1975 case before the US District Court for the District of

68.
See Lazaroff, supra note 7, at 357.
69.
See supra Part I.
70.
O'Bannon v. Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
71.
See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
72.
Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The CommensurabilityMyth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1, 9-10 (2016).
73.
The Rise of Commensurability mirrors the Chicago School of Thought's thesis that
courts should abandon making value judgments. See id. at 9. As Professor Allensworth argues in
The Commensurability Myth, courts often ignore the compelling fact that some value judgments
cannot be reduced to economics. See, e.g., id. at 20.
74.
Lazaroff, supra note 7, at 344.
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Massachusetts, a plaintiff college hockey player's antitrust challenge
was rejected.7 5 The court explained that the Sherman Act did not apply
because the plaintiff was a student and not a "competitor" under
antitrust law.76 Then, in Board of Regents, the Court indicated that a
line of demarcation existed exempting the amateurism rules from
judicial scrutiny because "[i]n order to preserve the character and
quality of th[is] 'product,' athletes must not be paid."7 7 The Court
discussed the societal value of amateurism to justify the conclusion that
amateurism rules should be considered valid and free from antitrust
scrutiny.7 8 Namely, the Court asserted that amateurism is valuable to
society because of its revered tradition in general and specifically
because of the importance of preserving the "student" portion of the
student-athlete status in higher education, as it "adds richness and
diversity to intercollegiate athletics." 79
However, in the 1970s and 1980s, proponents of the Chicago
School of Thought stressed the importance of ignoring societal values
during antitrust review, and this view later became the majority
viewpoint among the judiciary. 0 While the Court did not ignore value
judgments in its decision in Board of Regents,81 the Chicago School's
view has become widely accepted since. 82 Professor Robert Bork argued
that antitrust must serve "the single, unchanging value of wealth

Jones v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975).
75.
Id.
76.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102
77.
(1984).
See id. at 120. The societal value of amateurism had been continually used as a
78.
justification for surviving antitrust scrutiny before O'Bannon. See Gaines v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) ("Even in the increasingly commercial
modern world, this Court believes there is still validity to the Athenian concept of a complete
education derived from fostering full growth of both mind and body.").
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120 ("The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of
79.
a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports. There can be no question but that it needs

ample latitude to play that role, or that the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education
adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of
the Sherman Act.").
See Allensworth, supra note 72, at 11 ("Antitrust legal opinions since then are rife
80.
with characterizations of § 1 liability that imply symmetry between pro- and anticompetitive
effects. Courts will often discuss the 'net' competitive effect of a restriction, a concept that is
encouraged by the oft-quoted language from Chicago Board of Trade that 'the true test of legality
is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."').
In Board of Regents, the Court acted consistently with the Chicago School's view when
81.
it invalidated the NCAA's television plans by ignoring the NCAA's argument regarding value
judgments of the NCAA. See 468 U.S. at 133; Allensworth, supra note 72, at 9 (explaining the
Chicago School of Thought). However, the Court seemed to take a different view on the amateurism
regime, articulating that there is value in preserving the student-athlete in higher education. See
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
See Allensworth, supra note 72, at 9.
82.
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Professor Bork's statement focuses solely on the

impact of economic actors in the marketplace, arguing that social
morality or welfare is to be ignored in antitrust analysis.8 4 Bork argued
that the "true test of legality" in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United
States-one of the first antitrust cases of the twentieth centuryrequired the Court to evaluate the net effects of procompetitive actions
versus anticompetitive actions.85 This essentially requires the judiciary
to focus on the economic impact of a restraint on trade, rather than
other aspects of the restraint 8 6-such as the social value of amateurism.
Such a requirement poses a problem for the NCAA, as the chief
focus of the NCAA is not to promote economic competition amongst its
members, but indeed to restrain it in order to promote societal goals:
"keeping with the dignity and high purpose of education."8 7 Measuring
the value of the NCAA's goals compared to the economic effect of the
NCAA's regulations is like "judging whether a particular line is longer
than a particular rock is heavy."8 8 Regardless, antitrust jurisprudence
requires discounting the societal value into a measurable market.8 9 In
fact, once the plaintiffs challenging an NCAA rule prove it has
anticompetitive effects, the NCAA must respond under the "Rule of
Reason" by stating procompetitive justifications for the challenged
rule-effectively utilizing a balancing test to analyze the rule's effect
on competition in the marketplace. 90 This balancing requirement was
not as prevalent during the Board of Regents decision, but courts'
reluctance to rely on value judgements has continued to increase
since.9 1 Considering that the goal of moral values in sport cannot be
quantitatively measured in antitrust actions, the NCAA is forced to
argue that it restrains trade in pursuit of promoting the market for
college sports, 92 which is truly a secondary goal of the NCAA. Thus, the
NCAA is inherently disadvantaged in antitrust actions and should
delegate the cap on the amount of scholarship funds as an area of
autonomy to the Power Five Conferences.
83.
See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 838 (1965).
Id. at 817.
84.
85.
See id. at 817 (quoting Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
86.
See Allensworth, supra note 72, at 23 (arguing that commensurability in antitrust is
a myth, and that judges attempt to discount societal welfare to compare it to economic impact;
however, such measures simply cannot be reduced to the same unit).

87.
88.

See supraPart II.
See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988).

89.

Attempting to discount certain noneconomic factors

into comparable, economic

measurements is "commensurability." See Allensworth, supra note 72, at 8.
90.
See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918).
91.
See id. at 11.
92.
O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015).
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B. NCAA's Antitrust Demise
The NCAA freely admits that it restrains trade in collegiate
sports, arguing that because such restrictive trade principles in fact
promote the market more than restrict it." This "market promotion" is
the central debate surrounding NCAA regulations that suppress
emerging markets in college athletics.9 4 According to the Court in the
seminal Board of Regents case, it is undeniable that some restraints are
necessary to preserve the revered tradition of amateur intercollegiate
athletics. 95 The issue the NCAA faces, however, is how far those
restraints may go, as the Board of Regents court stated that "[i]t is
reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA
are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic
teams and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public
interest in intercollegiate athletics." 96
This Section utilizes the rejection of value judgments in
antitrust decisions, to reveal the inherent tension between the NCAA's
It first
amateurism rules and such commensurability analysis.
analyzes the earliest major antitrust suit levied against the NCAA,
Boardof Regents, continues with the Ninth Circuit's O'Bannon decision,
and concludes with the most recent antitrust action against the NCAA,
In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Litigation.
1. Board of Regents of Oklahoma v. NCAA
Once the plaintiff in an antitrust action demonstrates that the
defendant made an anticompetitive agreement, the burden shifts to the
for the
to
provide
procompetitive justifications
defendant
anticompetitive regulations enacted.9 7 In Board of Regents, the NCAA
proffered two justifications for the restraint: (1) Restricting the number
of college football games televised protects profits from gate attendance
for its member institutions and (2) the regulation preserves competitive
balance among the institutions.9 8
The Court rejected each of the proffered justifications.
Restricting the number of games televised provided no procompetitive
effect because many more games would have been accessible to viewers
93.
See id.
94.
See id.
95.
Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120
(1984).
96.
Id. at 117.
See id. at 113. The antitrust framework establishing this burden shifting is entitled
97.
the "Rule of Reason." Id.
Id. at 96.
98.
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if more games were televised. 99 Plus, restricting output essentially
capped the number of universities that could earn a profit from their
brand.1 00 Further, preserving competitive balance is possible without
such restrictions because every other college sport maintained
competitiveness without the television plan. 101
This justification
arguably cut in the plaintiffs' favor because allowing more games to be
televised would allow more programs to be on the same playing field as
the televised programs.
While some restrictions may have been
permissible, the television plan went too far in its restrictions and could
not survive the antitrust challenge.1 02
Scholars argue that the significance of the Court's decision was
not in its holding that invalidated the NCAA's action, but rather in dicta
in the opinion. 103 The dicta expressed a view that rules preventing
college athletes from earning compensation were presumptively valid
to protect the educational focus of college sports.1 04
This Note argues, however, that the Board of Regents litigation
forced the NCAA to abandon its only true justification for restricting its
member institutions from participating in such a lucrative market:
protecting the educational experience of its student-athletes. While
Justice Stevens may have expressed admiration for the desirable goal
of preserving the integrity of the NCAA, such reasoning was absent
from the Court's balancing of the procompetitive and anticompetitive
impact of the television plan.10 5 The Court indeed ignored the value of
amateurism when balancing the positive and negative effects of the
television plan, and thus antitrust decisions took a first step in the
demise of NCAA rules.

2. O'Bannon v. NCAA
In O'Bannon, the NCAA regulations challenged were simple:
student-athletes who are compensated for their names, images, or
likenesses are ineligible from competition at any NCAA program. 106
The challenge initially stemmed from EA Sports Company's famed
NCAA video games, where college athletes' jersey numbers, statistics,
and even body build were used to create lifelike video game

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 119.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 119.
Id.
See, e.g., Lazaroff, supranote 7, at 339.
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102.
Id. at 86.
See supra Part II.
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characters.1 0 7 Similar to the argument the institutions made in Board
of Regents, the O'Bannon plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA violated
antitrust law by restricting athletes' ability to collect in the apparent
market for their names, images, and likenesses.1 08 The court agreed
that the NCAA rule indeed restricted trade, however, the NCAA's
procompetitive justifications proved sufficient to hurdle the
challenge.109
Before reaching the depths of its decision in O'Bannon, the
Ninth Circuit prefaced its reasoning with the following statement: "As
far as we are aware, the district court's decision is the first by any
federal court to hold that any aspect of the NCAA's amateurism rules
violate the antitrust laws, let alone to mandate by injunction that the
That statement illustrates the
NCAA change its practices." 110
magnitude of the O'Bannon decision. O'Bannon effectively forced the
Ninth Circuit to decide whether to engage in the commensurability
analysis that antitrust jurisprudence requires or to carve out a quasiexception for NCAA amateurism rules. This Note argues that the court
did both. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit elected to subject the NCAA
amateurism rules to antitrust scrutiny because the rules were
unnecessarily burdensome, but held that preserving amateurism was a
justifiable, procompetitive restriction.1 1 1
First, the plaintiff-athletes satisfied their burden of proving a
restraint of trade at the district court, and thus the burden shifted to
the NCAA to justify its anticompetitive regulation. 112 The NCAA
offered four justifications: (1) preserving the notion of amateurism, (2)
encouraging competitive balance in NCAA football and basketball, (3)
balancing students' on-field experience with their in-classroom
experience, and (4) growing output in the market for college
The Ninth Circuit accepted the first and third
education.1 13
justifications, just as the district court had, while rejecting the second
and the fourth. 114
The district court dismissed "promoting competitive balance in
football and basketball" because the competitive balance sought had
already been eroded.1 15 This erosion was, and continues to be, a product

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See O'BANNON & MCCANN, supra note 57, at 3, 6; see also supra Part II.
O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1072-73.
Id. at 1053.
Id.
See id. at 1070-71.
Id. at 1058.
Id. at 1058-60.
Id. at 1058.
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of athletic departments increasing spending on lavish facilities,116 some
even amounting to athletic "villages,"1 17 to compete for top high school
recruits around the country. Thus, the court concluded that the arms
race for athletes in college sports extinguished whatever competitive
balance existed.1 18
Judge Wilken, writing the district court opinion, likewise
rejected a growing output in the education market as a justifiable
restraint for restricting players' ability to be compensated for their
names, images, and likenesses. 119 In other words, the NCAA argued
that limiting the dollar amount given to certain high-performing
athletes allows for a greater number of students to receive funds to
pursue education, increasing the output in the education market.
Conversely, the court discussed how a scholarship cap could have the
opposite effect. 120 While the offer of full tuition may be sufficient for
many athletes, the court explained that others might have a more
realistic opportunity to receive an education if they could receive
compensation above the value of cost of attendance. 121
The court's reasoning, however, is questionable. Lifting the
restraint may make education more accessible for a class of individuals
who have serious financial need, but it does not necessarily follow that
a larger number of individuals would be given access to education
through lifting the restraint. 122 An equally likely scenario is that the
same arms race occurring for the best facilities would occur for the best

116.
See Kevin Kiley, Playing Different Games, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 16, 2013),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/01/16/universities-spend-more-athletics-athleteacademics-student-report-finds [https://perma.cc/4U38-Q3GT].
117.
See Scott Davis, Here's the $55 Million 'Village' Clemson Will Build for Its Football
Players, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 23, 2015, 12:08 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/tour-clemsons-

players-village2015-12 [https://perma.cc/4KAF-5F96]. Clemson University moved into its $55
million exclusive "athletic village" in 2017, and it is comprised of extravagant amenities such as
pools, gaming areas for activities like bowling and beach volleyball, a grill area, and even an indoor
golf

simulator.

See

id.;

see

generally

Facilities,

DABOSWINNEY.COM,

http://www.daboswinney.com/facilities/ [https://perma.cc/SB9W-9MMN] (last visited Feb. 15,
2019).
118.
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059.
119.
Id. at 1060; O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 981 (N.D.
Cal. 2014).
120.
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072.
121.
Id. at 1073.
122.
In a recent survey conducted by the NCAA, less than half (47 percent) of firstgeneration students strongly agreed that they would have attended college without an athletic
scholarship.
See
The
First
in
Their
Family,
NCAA
(June
2016),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/first-their-family
[https://perma.ccfU8ZM-KS59].
While removing a cap may make college an accessible option for a class of individuals that needs
income in excess of the cost of attendance, an unregulated price could cause some universities to
spend differing amounts on each athlete, potentially decreasing the number of full tuition
scholarships. This option could decrease the total output in the market for athletic scholarships.
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recruits in the form of cash payments, and therefore many athletes at
less prestigious programs would be forced to decide between paying
some money to join a program on a partial scholarship or refraining
from college sports altogether. On the one hand, controlling price by
enacting a cap could create a larger output in the market for education
On the other hand, furthering the notion of
in college sports.
amateurism likely does not increase the market for viewing college
sports because, since the abolition of the Sanity Code in 1951, consumer
demand for college sports has continued to grow despite an increasing
amount of scholarship funds distributed to athletes. 123 Thus, this Note
argues that that the district court repeatedly erred in dismissing the
procompetitive justification of "increasing output in the college
education market." 12 4 This may be the only justifiable restraint for the
NCAA because it directly fits into the commensurability analysis
without making a judgment on the value of amateurism.
While the district court analyzed each of the NCAA's four
procompetitive justifications, the Ninth Circuit only examined the
"notion of
the
concerning
justifications
proffered
NCAA's
125 The Ninth Circuit failed to avoid making a value
amateurism."
judgment-contrary to the commensurability requirement-when it
accepted the first of the NCAA's two justifications regarding
amateurism: (1) integrating academics with athletics and (2) preserving
the popularity of the NCAA's product by promoting its current
understanding of amateurism. 126
The first theory the NCAA advanced, which both the district
court and the Ninth Circuit ultimately accepted, is that if college
athletes can accept large sums of money while spending time on
campus, a social divide will form between the athletes and the student
body. 127 The courts appeared to reason that such social divide
effectively erodes any opportunity for student-athletes to have a normal

See Revenue of the NCAA from Television Broadcast Payments and Licensing Rights
123.
2010-2022],
Revenue of the NCAA
[hereinafter
from 2010 to 2022, STATISTA
https://www.statista.com/statistics/219608/ncaa-revenue-from-television-rights-agreement/
https://perma.cc/3EEL-C5SC] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). In 2015, the NCAA changed its
scholarship regime to allow for awards up to the full cost of attendance for Division I athletes,
rather than full tuition. See Steve Berkowitz, NCAA to Distribute $18.9M to Help Pay Cost-of4:27
PM),
(July
20,
2015,
USA
TODAY
Scholarships,
Attendance
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/07/20/ncaa- 18-million-help-pay-costattendance-scholarships/30428777/ [https://perma.cclR2FA-4MUD]. Revenue from television
broadcasting agreements has increased from $666 million in 2012 to an expected $879 million in
2019. See Revenue of the NCAA 2010-2022, supra.
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1058.
124.
Id. at 1072.
125.
Id. at 1073.
126.
Id. at 1060.
127.
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student life. The Ninth Circuit also agreed that furthering the notion
of amateurism qualified as a procompetitive justification for the
anticompetitive action of preventing compensation for athletes' rights
to their names, images, and likenesses. 12 8
Unlike the second theory-preserving the popularity of the
NCAA's product-the court provided no economic justification for
considering academic integration as procompetitive. 129 Therefore, the
amateurism rules continued to succeed partially due to the court's
decision to ignore the commensurability requirement. 130 Such a
consideration is the type of value judgment antitrust law purports to
condemn and indeed has condemned in the majority of antitrust
decisions.1 3 1 Notably, the Ninth Circuit did recognize that a revered
dedication to preserving amateurism may be noble and violate the
principles of antitrust law at the same time. 132 Thus, without carving
out an exemption to the antitrust rules, 133 the only argument the NCAA
can advance in the wake of O'Bannon is that the notion of amateurism
increases the market for viewing college athletics. 1 34 In the wake of
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) inquiries into payments made to
college basketball players, however, the notion that amateurism
increases the market for viewing college athletics is brought into
question.135

128.
Id. at 1058.
129.
Id. at 1073.
130.
See id. at 1073. The court determined that two procompetitive purposes justified the
restraint: (1) integrating academics with athletics and (2) promoting its current understanding of
amateurism. Id. at 1073. While the second justification does articulate a market effect caused by
amateurism, it does not answer the question of whether integrating academics "promotes
competition" in the marketplace.
131.
See Bork, supra note 83, at 838.
132.
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073.
133.
Katherine Karg1, Note, Is Amateurism Really Necessary or Is It an Illusion Supporting
the NCAA's Anticompetitive Behaviors?: The Need for PreservingAmateurism in College Athletics,
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 410 (2017).
134.
See O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1080 n.2. This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit rejected
the most compelling argument the NCAA initially relied on in O'Bannon-increasing access to
education. This proposition was likewise rejected at the summary judgment stage in In re Grantin-Aid Litigation. In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Litigation, No. 14-md-02541 at 19. However, the
court's rejection of this proposition does not resolve its importance as a policy matter; it simply
reinforces this Note's conclusion that the rise of commensurability in antitrust creates pressure on
the NCAA in antitrust actions because the NCAA cannot utilize value judgments to defend its
anticompetitive actions.

135.
See Grant Newton, G League Contracts and FBI Investigations Change Little for
NCAA in Antitrust Actions, JETLAw BLOG (Nov. 3, 2018), http://www.jetlaw.org/2018/11/03/gleague-contracts-and-fbi-investigation-change-little-for-ncaa-in-antitrust-action/
[https://perma.ccBYW2-L5HL]. Additionally, the NBA's developmental league, entitled the "G
League," introduced select contracts in the fall of 2018. These select contracts could serve as a
mechanism, in addition to the FBI investigation, used by plaintiffs to reveal the demand college
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3. FBI Investigations into College Basketball
In late September of 2017, the Department of Justice brought
charges against executives of Adidas, 136 four NCAA men's basketball
coaches, and several "advisors" involved in a bribery scheme
orchestrated to put money in the pockets of athletes and their families,
while delivering said athletes to certain programs working in
Bringing these charges allowed
conjunction with Adidas.1 37
have called a "black market" for the
many
investigators to reveal what
138 This black market refers to payments
payment of college athletes.
made from shoe companies to Amateur Athletic Union (AAU)
programs 1 39 and other agents, where athletes were then delivered
payments in return for choosing particular schools. 140 Most college
sports fans were already aware of this market-even University of
Chicago President Robert Hutchins predicted this development in
The exposure of this underground market highlighted
1939.141
conversations regarding the compensation of college athletes during
their tenure at a university. The FBI's college basketball corruption
investigation in 2017 reflects the reality that a market is readily
available for athletes to be compensated for their abilities, but that the
NCAA rules suppress it.142 Despite overwhelming evidence of countless
athletes receiving compensation in the fall of 2017, the popularity of
college basketball did not suffer. 143 In fact, viewership of NCAA Men's
Basketball Tournament games actually increased from the prior
athletes garner in the market for their services. They are unlikely to change the NCAA's
arguments at this stage, however. See id.
Tom Winter & Tracy Connor, 4 NCAA Basketball Coaches, Shoe Executives Charged
136.
in Bribery Scandal, NBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017, 7:12 PM), https://www.nbenews.com/news/usnews/college-basketball-coaches-allegedly-took-bribes-agents-deliver-athletes-n804781
[https://perma.cc/LF5K-KJ6J].
Id.
137.
Will Hobson, Inside the Basketball Black Market That Put Adidas in the FBI's
138.
Crosshairs, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/inside-the2
basketball-black-market-that-put-adidas-in-the-fbis-crosshairs/ 0 18/10/0 1/2a73ba76-c lad-1 1e8[https://perma.cc/DNH8-XQC4].
97a5-able46bb3bc7-story.html?utmterm=.739b8b4b989d
See id. AAU programs are basketball teams that travel across the country to allow
139.
their elite players to be seen by college coaches. Several ofthese programs receive full sponsorships
for all of their players to receive gear to wear in games from major shoe companies, such as Nike
or Adidas. These sponsorships exceeded simply "gear" and extended to the shoe companies working
through agents and AAU programs to ensure that certain high-caliber prospects ended up at
universities that were sponsored by the shoe company. See id.
Id.
140.
Williams, supra note 27.
141.
See Hobson, supra note 138.
142.
Dan Wolken, FBI Scandal Doesn't Cast a Pall over NCAA Tournament. It Lifts One,
143.
USA TODAY (Mar. 14, 2018, 3:31 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/columnist/
dan-wolken/2018/03/14/fbi-scandal-ncaa-tournament-amateurism/425159002/
[https://perma.cc/FJC4-B2GF.
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year. 144
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's assumption in O'Bannon that
preserving amateurism actually increases the popularity of college
sports is questionable. 1 4 5
The judiciary and the NCAA are now in a peculiar position. The
judiciary is faced with a decision to follow precedent in antitrust
jurisprudence by ignoring value judgments 1 46 or to carve out an
antitrust exemption for the NCAA. 1 4 7 Moreover, the NCAA is certainly
on notice of the validity of antitrust claims against it and must decide
how to respond. 14 8 This Note argues that the In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid
Cap Litigationcase in the Northern District of California illustrates the
insufficient nature of the NCAA's response with its adoption of the
areas of autonomy in 2014. This Note proposes utilizing the principles
of federalism to expand the areas of autonomy to include giving each of
the Power Five Conferences the individual right to choose its own grantin-aid cap.
C. The Insufficiency of the NCAA's Response to the Investigations
The NCAA has recognized the validity of the antitrust actions
against it and the need to respond with governance and rule changes.
This Section begins by addressing the ways in which the NCAA has
attempted to effectuate change. It concludes by explaining how the
latest litigation, In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Litigation, illustrates
the insufficiency of the NCAA's responses.

144.
See Daniel Holloway, TV Ratings: NCAA Men's Tournament Up Slightly for CBS,
Variety (Mar. 16, 2018, 3:56 PM), https://variety.com/2018/tv/news/tv-ratings-ncaa-1202728915
[https://perma.cc/57B6-JMWZ]/. CBS reported an 11 percent increase in first-round viewership
from the 2017 NCAA tournament to the 2018 tournament. See id.
145.
See id.; Wolken, supra note 143.
146.
Preserving the notion of amateurism today must be a value judgment because of the
increasing evidence that viewership of college sports games continues to grow, and viewership
numbers would not decline if athletes were to be paid. See Holloway, supra note 144.
147.
Scholars have argued that the best method for solving the judiciary's problem is to
carve out an exemption from the antitrust laws for the NCAA, or for Congress to interfere with
legislation protecting amateurism. See, e.g., Kargl, supra note 133, at 379. Others have argued
that the entire notion of amateurism should be eliminated through serious policy reform. See
Lazaroff, supra note 7, at 366. This Note does not address either of those solutions, but rather
proposes that the NCAA utilize principles of federalism and expand the areas of autonomy adopted
in 2014 to offer conferences the ability to create their own caps on financial aid, rather than
subjecting every institution to the NCAA broad ban.
148.
See, e.g., Field Level Media, Condoleezza Rice: NCAA Rules 'Incomprehensible,'
REUTERS: SPORTS NEWS (May 10, 2018, 7:58 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-basketballncaa-condoleezza-rice/condoleezza-rice-ncaa-rules-incomprehensible-idUSKBN llB 1TZ
[https://perma.cc/4GC6-6XLA]. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice chaired the
Commission on College Basketball that released its findings in the spring of 2018. The Commission
found the name, image, and likeness restrictions "incomprehensible" and submitted such findings
to the NCAA for review. See id.
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1. Adoption of the Areas of Autonomy
In response to the threat that the Power Five Conferences might
leave the NCAA and pressure from the O'Bannon proceedings, the
NCAA passed Amendment 5.3.2.1.2.149 This amendment, as mentioned
above, creates eleven zones of authority where the conferences can
enact legislation to govern themselves.1 50 This Note argues that the
NCAA should adjust the areas of autonomy by utilizing principles of
federalism as a means to relieve antitrust pressure.
The current areas of autonomy fail to relieve the pressure
antitrust actions place on the NCAA. Delegating "areas of autonomy"
to the conferences was somewhat of a misnomer. The conferences do
not have individual autonomy, but rather collective autonomy. 151 In
other words, the NCAA gave the Power Five Conferences a separate
voting regime, where as a collective unit they can pass legislation to
govern themselves. 152 For example, the Big 12 Conference must abide
by NCAA rules because each of its members is in contractual privity
with the NCAA.1 53 The passage of the areas of autonomy did not give
the Big 12-or any other conference-the ability to govern itself, like
this Note argues it should. It simply adopted a rule authorizing the Big
12, the Big Ten, the Southeastern Conference, the Pac-12 Conference,
and the Atlantic Coastal Conference to adopt legislation that would
bind all five of the conferences in the same way. Therefore, the NCAA
forces the Power Five Conferences to price-fix-the very act that
immediately shifts the burden from the plaintiffs to the NCAA in
antitrust actions-because each conference is required to bind itself to
the decisions of the group.1 54
The conferences did utilize the areas of autonomy to raise the
scholarship amount given to incoming student-athletes from what was
originally the cost of tuition up to the cost of attendance in January

NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 5.3.2.1.2.
149.
See id. (enumerating the "areas of autonomy" as athletics personnel; insurance and
150.
career transition; promotional activities unrelated to athletics participation; recruiting
restrictions; pre-enrollment expenses and support; financial aid; awards, benefits, and expenses;
academic support; health and wellness; meals and nutrition; and time demands); supra Section
11.2.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 5.3.2.1.
151.
Brian D. Shannon, The Revised NCAA Division I Governance Structure After Three
152.
Years: A Scorecard, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 65, 79 (2017).
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 3.0.1.3; NCAA Membership, NCAA,
153.
http://www.ncaa.org/governance/membership [https://perma.cc/N3ZS-52U9] (last visited Feb. 15,
2019).
See O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2015);
154.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 5.3.2.1.
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certainly benefits athletes, it does not
delineate autonomy to the individual conferences. As mentioned above,
all five conferences are still forced to follow the exact same funding
structure as one another, and thus the price-fixing regime continues.
Therefore, even after the adoption of the areas of autonomy, the NCAA
still conducts a restraint of trade per section 1 of the Sherman Act and
faces the burden of justifying such restraint. 15 7
2. The "Committed to Change" Campaign
On August 8, 2018, the NCAA launched a new campaign entitled
"Committed to Change."1 58 The opening statement from NCAA leaders
on college basketball reform began as follows: "The September 2017
announcement of a federal investigation into fraud in college basketball
recruiting made it clear the NCAA needed to make significant
changes-and do so quickly."1 5 9
These reforms purport to minimize the amount of outside
influences on student-athletes, broaden athletes' ability to make a
decision about their personal ability to turn pro, levy harsher
punishment for infractions, and create a more efficient and binding
infractions process. 160 The NCAA's "commitment to change" expressed
great intentions on the surface, but it does not provide a practical
solution to the validity of antitrust actions levied against it. Despite
the proposed solution, the NCAA retains total control over the amount
of funds schools can provide athletes in return for their education and
experience as a collegiate athlete.

155.
Shannon, supra note 152, at 78-79.
156.
While the NCAA rulemaking process is different than that of Congress or state
legislatures, the NCAA uses similar language. Compare 2018-19 NCAA DIVISION I AUTONOMY
LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS
(2018),
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/201819DIGovAutonomyLegislativeProcess_20180906.pdf [https://perma.cc/P52J-M8TJ], with The
Legislative

Process, U.S.

HOUSE

OF

REPRESENTATIVES,

https://www.house.gov/the-house-

explained/the-legislative-process [https://perma.cc/475R-U2V9] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). Thus,
the rulemaking and adopting process is called "legislation" in the NCAA Manual. See, e.g., NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 9, § 2.01 ("Legislationenacted by the Association governing the conduct of
intercollegiate athletics shall be designed to advance one or more basic principles, including the
following, to which the members are committed." (emphasis added)).
157.
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073; see also In re NCAA Grant-in-AidLitigation, No. 14-md02541 at 2.
158.
Committed to Change: A Look Back, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/committedchange#timeline [https://perma.cc/D8QZ-7JP7] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
159.
Id.
Id.
160.
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3. In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Litigation
Four years after Judge Wilken handed down a district court
decision in O'Bannon, she oversaw another lawsuit levied against the
NCAA, In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Litigation.161 While the crux of
the plaintiffs' argument in O'Bannon centered around the price-fixing
of athletes in regard to compensate rights for their name, image, and
likeness, the plaintiffs in the Grant-in-Aid Litigation focus their
argument on the price-fixing of athletes compensation in exchange for
their performance.16 2
The plaintiffs' goal in O'Bannon was to garner recognition from
the courts that a market existed for their names, images, and
likenesses. The plaintiffs' goal in In re Grant-in-Aid Litigation is to
have the athlete's on-field performance recognized as marketable.1 63
This issue is decided under a Rule of Reason analysis, which analyzes
whether a scheme merely regulates competition in a way to promote it,
or whether it suppresses and destroys competition. 164 Accordingly, the
plaintiffs in In re Grant-in-Aid litigation and in O'Bannon met the
initial burden at the summary judgment stage under a Rule of Reason
analysis, and thus the burden shifted to the NCAA, which must then
establish a procompetitive justification for placing a cap on the amount
of grant-in-aid available for players.1 65
In In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Litigation, the plaintiff
student-athletes challenged the current NCAA rules limiting the
compensation programs can offer athletes in exchange for their athletic
services.1 6 6 The challenged NCAA rules, discussed throughout this
Note, enact a cap on the amount of funds an athlete can receive during
one calendar year of athletics and education.1 67 The plaintiffs met the
initial Rule of Reason burden by proving a significant anticompetitive
effect, shifting the burden to the NCAA to prove a procompetitive
Judge Wilken presides over the In re Grant-in-Aid Litigation case. See John Richard
161.
Carrigan, Play for Pay Won't Go Away: The NCAA Is Again Defending Antitrust Litigation over
29, 2018),
(Sept.
REV.
NAT'L L.
Student Athletes,
Limits on Payments to
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/play-pay-won-t-go-away-ncaa-again-defending-antitrustlitigation-over-limits [https://perma.ccl5XVL-SCHJ].
Conduct Detrimental Episode 35: College Sports on Trial with Andy Schwarz,
162.
THEWHITEBRONCO 4:06-:16 (Oct. 1 2018), http://thewhitebronco.com/2018/10/episode-35-collegesports-on-trial-with-andy-schwarz/ [https://perma.ccF5WP-Y63E].
Id. at 4:20-:45. In fact, "[i]f the Plaintiffs in Jenkins succeed, the NCAA would not be
163.
permitted to impose any cap on student-athlete compensation." Thomas A. Baker III & Natasha
T. Brison, From Board of Regents to O'Bannon: How Antitrust and Media Rights Have Influenced
College Football, 26 MARQ. SPORTs L. REV. 331, 359 (2016).
See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918).
164.
165.
In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Litigation, No. 14-md-02541 at 2.
Id. at 1-2.
166.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 2.1.3
167.
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justification for its conduct. 168 Evidence of significant anticompetitive
effects were clear. Judge Wilken explained that in 2013, the Power Five
Conferences proposed that the NCAA allow student-athletes to receive
greater direct compensation, rather than continued indirect
compensation through expenditures on "opulent athletic facilities and
multimillion dollar coaches' salaries." 169 However, the NCAA rejected
the proposal and retained its current structure, limiting grant-in-aid
athletic scholarships to the cost of attendance-the remedy fashioned
in O'Bannon.170
To justify its current regulations, the court considered two
procompetitive justifications from the NCAA at trial: (1) integration of
student athletes with the student body and (2) consumer demand for
amateurism.17 1
The court rejected the first theory for several
reasons. 172 First, as compensation for athletes increased from the preO'Bannon compensation scheme to the cost of attendance payment
scheme, graduation rates for student-athletes also increased. 173
Second, Judge Wilken explained that income disparities between
students on campus inherently exist from varying socioeconomic
backgrounds. 174 Additionally, the challenged rules already increase
separation among students, as the compensation limits incentivize
universities to spend money on "unregulated frills" in facilities that
indirectly benefit athletes rather than payments which would directly
benefit them.1 75
Despite Judge Wilken's critique of the procompetitive
justification of integration, the court accepted the NCAA's argument
that consumer demand for college athletics is aided by preserving a
distinction between amateur sports and professional sports.1 76
According to the court, "[I]t follows that the distinction between college
and professional sports arises because student-athletes do not receive

168.
In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Litigation, No. 14-md-02541 at 2.
169.
Id. at 16.
170.
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074.
171.
In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Litigation, No. 14-md-02541 at 19, 46.
172.
Id. at 52-53 ("Because Defendants have not met their burden to show that the
challenged limits are procompetitive due to an effect on promoting integration, by preventing a
wedge or otherwise, the Court finds that Defendants have not shown that the challenged rules are
justified based on this theory.").
173.
Id. at 48.
174.
Id. at 49.
175.
Id. at 51 ("[T]he challenged compensation limits result in schools spending their
recruitment resources on 'unregulated frills' in facilities that benefit student-athletes
exclusively.").
176.
Id. at 44 ('The court does credit the importance to consumer demand of maintaining
a distinction between college sports and professional sports.").
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unlimited payments unrelated to education."17 7 In lieu of her findings,
Judge Wilken issued an injunction for the NCAA to alter its
compensation rules to permit payments to be made to student-athletes
above the cost of attendance, so long as such payments are tailored to
education.1 78
The NCAA appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth
Circuit. Judge Wilken's ruling continued to cut back against the
NCAA's defenses to its amateurism regime, as the O'Bannon court
accepted the integration with the student body, but Judge Wilken
rejected it.179 However, the procompetitive justification of preserving a
line of demarcation between professional and collegiate athletics
survived, preserving the NCAA's "revered tradition of amateurism."1 8 0
Despite the NCAA's narrow victory, it is clear that antitrust pressure
continues to mount, and the NCAA should adopt principles of
federalism to relieve itself from that pressure.
III. UTILIZING PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM TO RELIEVE ANTITRUST
PRESSURE

This Part proposes a solution to the NCAA's inherent tension
with antitrust law. As antitrust law continues to ignore value
judgments and focus on economic impacts, the NCAA's chief
justification for restraining trade-amateurism-becomes inadequate.
Thus, rather than waiting on Congress to carve out an exemption to the
Sherman Act, 18 1 relying on the courts to continue utilizing a quasiexception to antitrust law, 182 or releasing the Power Five Conferences
from the NCAA altogether,1 83 the NCAA should take a proactive

-

Id. at 45.
177.
Id. at 97 ("The alternative being adopted would remove NCAA caps on education178.
related benefits only.").
In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Litigation, No. 14-md-02541 at 52-53.
179.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120; In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Litigation, No. 14-md-02541
180.
at 44.
Lazaroff, supra note 7, at 332-33.
181.
Karg1, supra note 133, at 410.
182.
Bush, supra note 41, at 10. This Note's suggestion is limited in scope to the Power Five
183.
Conferences for several reasons. Most notably is that the gap between yearly revenue for Power
Five Conferences and the remaining conferences is tremendous. For example, in 2014, the Big 12
received the lowest revenue of all Power Five Conferences at $220 Million, while the highest nonPower Five Conference returned just over $16 million. See Zach Barnett, The Difference between
the Power Five and the Rest of FBS: $300 Million, FoOTBALLSCOOP (June 12, 2014),
300
http://footballscoop.com/news/the-difference-between-the-power-five-and-the-rest-of-fbsmillion/
[https://perma.cc/C8NB-W3T8].
See
generally
Big
12
Conference,
XH,
http://www.bigl2sports.com [https://perma.ccNS24-Z2TY] (last visited Feb 16, 2019). Thus, the
resources to offer scholarships above cost of attendance are much higher in the Power Five than
in the other conferences making up the NCAA. See Erik Brady et al., College Athletics Finance
Reports: Non-Power 5 Schools Face Huge Money Pressure, USA TODAY (May 26, 2015, 7:49 PM),
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approach. Principles of federalism should be used to relieve the NCAA
from antitrust pressure, while allowing the organization to continue
working towards its original purpose: maintaining the safety and
integrity of student-athletes in the pursuit of an education. 184
A. Principlesof Federalism
The NCAA should utilize principles of federalism to insulate
itself from antitrust scrutiny. Federalism is the vertical separation of
power between the federal government and the state governments.1 8 5
James Madison first articulated the value served by federalism when
he wrote that "[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to
the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain
in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."1 8 6 Thus, the
concept of federalism centers on delegating authority to several actors
rather than subsuming all authority in one governing body. Federalism
protects zones of authority from intrusion by the federal government
when such zones are the "state's traditional prerogative." 1 7 Thus,
states have traditionally reserved the right to control education, police
powers, and the health and welfare of their citizens without federal
intrusion.1 88
Another benefit of federalism is that it allows states to serve as
"laboratories of democracy." 189 If one state enacts a new rule or statute,
the rest of the states may benefit from the enactment by witnessing its
success or failure without suffering direct consequences. For example,
in Florida, the state legislature altered attorneys' fees in medical
malpractice actions by enacting "loser pays" compensation. 190 The
experiment failed, revealing to the rest of the states that the American
rule for attorneys' fees may in fact be more desirable. 19 1

https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/05/26/ncaa-athletic-finances-revenue-

expense-division-il2 7971457/ [https://perma.cc/YQ4F-HEN7].
184.
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, §§ 1.2-.3 (outlining the policies and goals of the
organization); supra Part I.
185.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPALS AND POLICIES 3 (5th ed.

2015).
186.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
187.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 459, 462 (1991) ("In the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.").
188.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[O]ur
cases are quite clear that there are real limits to federal power.").
189.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
190.
See Francis J. Carney, "Loser Pays"-Justice for the Poorest and the Richest, Others
Need Not Apply, 8 UTAH B.J. 18, 18-19 (1995).
191.
Id.
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Lastly, federalism protects individuals from potential tyranny at
either the state or federal level by each level of government serving as
a check on the other. 192 As Justice O'Connor explained, "a healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." 193
B. Applying FederalismPrinciplesto the NCAA
Federalism, the vertical separation of the federal government
from state governments, can be applied to the NCAA by utilizing the
current vertical separation between the NCAA and the individual
This Note recognizes that
conferences in a governance scheme.
federalism is a discrete legal concept applied to governments. While
the NCAA is not a government, this Note proposes that the NCAA
should adjust its governance structure drawing from principles of
This Section examines how the above principles of
federalism.
federalism would apply to the NCAA, before explaining why such
changes relieve the NCAA from antitrust pressure.
First, the NCAA should grant general autonomy to the
conferences with limited zones of authority reserved for itself. The
NCAA should retain authority over the traditional areas that the NCAA
was created to govern: educational requirements and the infractions
process. The traditional prerogatives of the NCAA were "keeping with
the dignity and high purpose of education." 194 As long as students
maintain academic standards and avoid violating the NCAA Code of
Conduct, the NCAA's original purpose is served. Therefore, rather than
enumerating specific "areas of autonomy" to the Power Five
Conferences, like Amendment 5.3.2.1 in the current NCAA Manual, 19 5
the NCAA should grant general autonomy to the conferences and
expressly reserve limited authority to itself.
Specifically, the NCAA's Amendment could read as follows: 'The
Conferences shall retain indefinite authority to adopt or amend
legislation for their own member institutions as they see fit, so long as
such legislation does not conflict with an area of authority reserved for
the NCAA." Such traditional realms of authority that would be retained
by the NCAA include the student-athlete code of conduct, infractions
appeals, and minimum grade eligibility requirements. Again, this is
consistent with the NCAA's original mission: regulating the dignity and

192.
193.
194.
195.

See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 525 (1995).
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
See Notable Educators, supra note 18; supra Part I.
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 5.3.2.1.
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high purpose of education. 196 The proposed legislation above varies
from the current amendment because instead of giving the Power Five
Conferences the ability to adopt legislation that binds all five
conferences collectively, it gives each conference the ability to adopt
certain legislation for itself. It thus enables the conferences to act
similarly to states, serving as "laboratories of democracy" in collegiate
sports.
Lastly, the solution that federalism proposes in many courts'
interpretations of the constitutional structure is vertical separation
between the governing bodies of the states and the federal government,
preventing either body from garnering too much control. 197 This same
vertical separation can be used within the NCAA by reserving
compensation and name, image, and likeness legislation to the
individual conferences. Federalism proposes leaving traditional state
prerogatives, such as the police power of the states, to the states to
govern. 19 Similarly, the individual conferences already
retain
autonomy to negotiate broadcasting rights with various media
companies since the decision in Board of Regents.19 9 However, the
NCAA sets rules and regulations that bind all student-athletes,
regardless of the conference they participate in or the demand their
talent garners. 200 The NCAA should instill vertical separation from the
conferences by preserving educational requirements and studentathlete codes of conduct, while relinquishing rulemaking authority
regarding compensation to the conferences. Conducting this separation
would create a market among the conferences to decide the value of
student-athlete services rather than operating a price-fixing
monopsony like the current system.2 01 Further, the Power Five
Conferences would not be subject to the same antitrust challenges as
the NCAA because sports leagues may adopt rules to govern themselves
that promote competition. 202 The NCAA would struggle to make the
same argument, as the Power Five already competes at an enormously
196.
See Notable Educators, supra note 18; supra Part I.
197.
Federalism arose in the early twentieth century as an interpretation of the structure
between the federal government and the states as one where each retained individual zones of
authority. Gabriel Pacyniak, Making the Most of Cooperative Federalism:What the Clean Power
Plan Has Already Achieved, 29 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 301, 313 (2017).
198.
See generally Clause 3: Federalism Limits on Exercise of Commerce Power, LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edulconstitution-conan/article- 1/section-8/clause-3
[http://perma.cc/63GN-UK6G] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
199.
See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120
(1984).
200.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 3.1.2.4.
201.
O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015).
202.
Members of sports' leagues must adopt rules that allow one another to compete. See
Bush, supra note 41, at 10.
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higher level than its peers. 203 In 2014, the gap in revenue between
Power Five Conferences and the "Group of 5" Conferences was near
$300 million, and it continues to grow. 204 Thus, competition among the
many conferences is already essentially nonexistent, hence why the
court in O'Bannon rejected this procompetitive justification. 2 0 5
C. Benefits of Federalism
The most obvious benefit of utilizing principles of federalism is
the NCAA's relief from antitrust liability. For instance, in the current
NCAA landscape, setting the value of all Division I athletic scholarships
at the cost of attendance shifts the burden from the plaintiff to the
NCAA in an antitrust action. 206 This burden shifting occurs because
the buyers in the market for collegiate athletes, the universities, agree
to offer the same amount for each scholarship. 20 7 Yet, if principles of
federalism are utilized and compensation rules are delegated to each
conference, the individual conferences will form a competitive market
with one another by making separate decisions as to the compensation
package to offer each athlete. Unlike the NCAA, which established one
price among all competitors, the Power Five Conferences would now
The
individually decide the scholarship level for its members.
conferences would need to avoid making agreements on price levels
with one another, however, or the antitrust challenges could simply
shift to the Power Five Conferences. Regardless, the NCAA would be
relieved of antitrust pressure and a market for economic competition
would be created.
For example, instead of speculating that payments above the
cost of attendance would decrease the popularity of the sport,2 08 one
conference could adopt legislation permitting payment above the cost of
attendance, and the remaining conferences would have the ability to
witness the effects of such legislation. Further, conferences could elect
to allow third party sponsors to contract with student-athletes for the
rights to their name, image, and likeness without jeopardizing athletes'

See Barnett, supra note 183.
203.
Id. The "Group of 5" Conferences make up the second largest group of conferences in
204.
the NCAA. The Power Five Conferences refer to the largest sixty-five schools, while the Group of
5 Conferences refer to the remaining schools that compete in NCAA football, aside from a handful
of "independents," or schools with no conference affiliation.
See O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059; Barnett, supra note 183.
205.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98, 113
206.
(1984).
See O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
207.
This is the justification levied by the NCAA in In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Litigation.In
208.
re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Litigation, No. 14-md-02541 at 19.
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eligibility. Again, this would allow the NCAA and the conferences to
witness the positive and negative effects of certain schemes which have
yet to be utilized. Even if the conferences elected not to adopt these
changes, the NCAA would still be relieved from antitrust liability
because unlike the current NCAA model, athletes could serve as actors
in a competitive marketplace without price-fixing restrictions.
Lastly, allocating a greater zone of authority to the conferences
would immediately remove the monopolizing effect that each NCAA
amendment creates. 209 Removing this monopolizing effect creates a
market for competition among the many conferences and removes the
NCAA from antitrust liability.
D. Downfalls of Federalism
One reservation the NCAA may have in granting such authority
to the conferences is that the conferences may elect to split from the
NCAA entirely. 210 However, this concern suggests a misunderstanding
of the use of federalism principles. The NCAA boasts nearly 115 years
of governance, thus it is equipped to handle student disciplinary
conduct, disputes between conferences, national championship series,
and much more. Unlike the conferences, who primarily focus on
revenue generation through the relationship with media companies and
the college football playoff, 2 1 1 the NCAA's compliance and governance
structures serve a nonrevenue generating function that would be
unnecessary for each conference to develop. Additionally, the NCAA
could still serve its nonprofit purpose.
Another potential downfall relates to the most valid justification
for the current cap on scholarship funds: growing the output in the
college education market. 212 As mentioned in Part II, the NCAA
attempted to justify its restraint on trade in O'Bannon by alleging that
the cap on scholarships allows for more scholarships to be given.2 13 This

209.
Res judicata bars suits from being litigated repetitively. See Definition: Res Judicata,
LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edulwex/resjudicata [https://perma.cc/2UQ8-LNPP]
(last visited Feb. 15, 2019). However, res judicata does not apply when the NCAA changes its rules
and regulations. See generally Summary Judgment Order, In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Litigation,
4:14-md-02541-CW, at *21 (N.D. Cal. 2018). Thus, each time an NCAA rule is adjusted, the door
is opened for classes of athletes to bring suit once again.
210.
This has been argued for by some scholars, including Connor Bush. See, e.g., Bush,
supra note 41, at 49.
211.
See Taylor Branch, NCAA to Congress: Change Is Coming, ATLANTIC (July 24, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.comlentertainment/archive/2014/07/the-ncaa-tells-congress-its-going-toreform-itself/374948/ [https://perma.cc/E6N7-FLQG].
212.
See supraPart II (using "growing the output" in the education market as a justification
for the restraint on trade).
213.
O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2015).
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is a valid concern consistent with the original purpose of the NCAA. If
the NCAA's goal is to promote the integration of sport and education,
having the greatest number of scholarships possible would certainly be
a way of furthering that goal.
However, the NCAA could still further this goal through its
minimum sport requirement for Division I status. 2 14 If a program did
not maintain the minimum level of requisite male and female sports,
then the program could lose Division I status. 215 Furthermore, Title IX
requirements will continue to encourage the maintenance of
nonrevenue sports by revenue sports. 2 16 Lastly, the same concern offers
a currently unavailable benefit: a class of individuals might be included
in collegiate sports that is currently excluded. Indeed, as the Ninth
Circuit noted, loosening the financial restriction might open the door
for recruits to attend college who otherwise could not. 2 1 7
Finally, the benefit of the conferences serving as "laboratories of
democracy" also garners the critique that a lack of uniformity might
exist among the conferences, and that such disparity could undermine
the product of college sports and decrease its value to viewers.
However, such disparities already exist. 2 18 Unless the NCAA plans on
creating a requisite budget for each athletic department in the country,
the programs with the greatest success will achieve an advantage the
following year, and the programs that struggle will be disadvantaged.
The greater injustice, however, is operating a system that spends
2 19 in an
millions of dollars on unnecessary amenities and facilitieS
attempt to attract athletes who might be better off placing their share
of such windfall in a postgraduate fund. Therefore, the potential

See Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivision Classification, NCAA,
214.
http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/divisional-differences-and-historymultidivision-classification [https://perma.cc/G6BC-65FG] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019) (detailing
the current sport requirements for divisions).

/

Id.
215.
See Nathan Boninger, Antitrust and the NCAA: Sexual Equality in CollegiateAthletics
216.
as a Procompetitive Justificationfor NCAA Compensation Restrictions, 65 UCLA L. REV. 754, 758
(2018). Title IX laws require the same number of male and female opportunities on campus. See
id.
See O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d at 1073 ("Indeed, if anything,
217.
loosening or abandoning the compensation rules might be the best way to 'widen' recruits' range
of choices; athletes might well be more likely to attend college, and stay there longer, if they knew
that they were earning some amount of NIL income while they were in school."); Fisher, supra
note 24, at 669 ("[Professional football] ... is viewed in many communities as the key tool for social
mobility.").
David Jones, Revenue Gap Between College Football Elite and Poor Just Keeps
218.
8
2
Widening, PENNLIVE (May 16, 2018), https://www.pennlive.com/pennstatefootball/index.ssf/ 01
05/penn-statefootball-revenue-pi.html [https://perma.cc/655H-3339].
See, supra note 110 and accompanying text.
219.
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outweighed by the potential benefits.

1123
are strongly

IV. CONCLUSION
Antitrust law frowns upon the balancing of value judgments
against economic impacts. 220 The NCAA's chief justification for
amateurism rules is the social value they create. Thus, the NCAA
structure inherently creates tension with the antitrust laws. Principles
of federalism could relieve this tension by expanding conferences'
autonomy from that of collective autonomy to individual autonomy,
creating a market for competition amongst the conferences.
Additionally, the NCAA's founding purpose of maintaining the integrity
and high purpose of education could remain intact. Despite concerns of
a lack of uniformity or a decreased output in the market for college
education, the benefits of different legislative schemes amongst the
conferences outweigh the pitfalls. The NCAA should act swiftly and
utilize principles of federalism to solve its antitrust problems before it
is too late to act at all.
Grant Newton*
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